INTRODUCTION
Hands-on experimental training in the physical behavior of multiplying systems is one of ten key areas of training required for practitioners to become qualified in the discipline of criticality safety as identified in DOE-STD-1135-99, Guidance for Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer Training and Qualification.
This document is a criticality safety evaluation of the training activities (or operations) associated with HS-3200, Laboratory Class for Criticality Safety. These activities utilize the Training Assembly for Criticality Safety (TACS).
The original intent of HS-3200 was to provide LLNL fissile material handlers with a practical hands-on experience as a supplement to the academic training they receive biennially in HS-3100, Fundamentals of Criticality Safety, as required by ANSI/ANS-8.20-1991, Nuclear Criticality Safety Training.
HS-3200 is to be enhanced to also address the training needs of nuclear criticality safety professionals under the auspices of the NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program 1 .
REQUIREMENTS
This document is provided in response to a Livermore Site Office 2 (previously a part of the DOE Oakland Operations Office) identified need for a new criticality safety evaluation to revise and supercede the preliminary study 3 by Koponen.
Crites 4 and Barnett 5 have published descriptions of the TACS. Details of the assembly machine 6 and associated parts are available in drawings, COMATS 7 , and a detailed inspection report 8 . Drawings of the D-38 9 and Oy 10 hemishells, chemical analysis results from samples of the Lucite and D-38 parts, and an engineering note on the Am-Li neutron source are also available. The relevant part details used in developing the COG model of the TACS assembly (see Section 6) are summarized in the tables below. The Lucite moderator parts are hemi-shells with a common outer radius so that only two parts will nest within the Oy (or D-38) cavity. The maximum authorized moderator mass is 694.8 grams corresponding to parts M3A and M3B. The maximum (average) Lucite reflector thickness is 3.94 inches (or 10.0 cm) obtained by nesting R2A and R2B within R3A and R3B. The measured thickness of the cadmium hemishells ranges from 22 -31 mils for part Cd-1 and 19 -32 mils for part Cd-2. These hemishells are designed to nest snuggly within Lucite reflector parts R4A and R4B, which in turn may be nested within R3A and R3B.
A diaphragm separates the two halves of the TACS assembly. It has been measured and determined to be a 0.010-inch thick Al-6061 sheet with a central 1-inch inner diameter hole that accommodate the source and an outer diameter of 17.468 inches. A new, stiffer, 0.030-inch thick Al-6061 diaphragm may be fabricated for future use. The Al-6061 neutron source holder has yet to be designed and fabricated.
METHODOLOGY
This criticality safety evaluation uses two principal methods for the determination of subcriticality; namely direct comparison to subcritical experiments and COG calculations of the effective neutron multiplication constant (k-eff).
SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS
The TACS is a known configuration that has been assembled many times with a measured central source leakage multiplication of about 10 as published by Barnett 5 for the assembly in its highest reactivity configuration. This is an adequate margin of safety for manual operations (i.e., hand assembly).
COG CALCULATIONS
The LLNL-developed Monte-Carlo code COG 12 (version 10.19c ) was used to make all calculations of the effective neutron multiplication constant (k-eff). The COG code developers installed, verified, and maintain this version on the GPS machines for criticality safety applications. All calculations utilized the ENDF/B-VI (Release 7) pointwise (continuous) cross-sections (except for copper and lead which utilize RED2002) and ENDF/B-VI (Release 2) S(α,β) data.
This methodology has been validated against critical experiments with highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal using the benchmark specifications from the ICSBEP Handbook
13
. The benchmark experiments include similar shapes (e.g., spheres, hemispheres, nested shells) and similar moderator and reflector materials (Lucite, water, polyethylene) from several US and foreign laboratories.
The details of the individual benchmark results are provided in Appendix B and presented graphically in the plot below. The ordinate is labeled bias, which is the difference in the COG (calculated) and ICSBEP (benchmark) k-eff values. The abscissa is labeled MFE, which is the median energy of those neutrons producing fission events.
In examining the benchmark results given in the figure, we see that for a wide variety of 193 benchmark experiments, the COG calculational bias does not result in an under-prediction in excess of -1% ∆k-eff.
The mean bias in the COG calculated critical k-eff value is estimated as 0.0010 ± 0.0047 (unweighted) or -0.0023 ± 0.0010 (weighted 14 ). An adequate criterion for subcriticality is:
where, B is the weighted estimate of the mean bias (-0.0023); U is the total uncertainty (0.0047), which is estimated as the root-mean-square-sum of the unweighted bias uncertainty (0.0047) and Monte-Carlo calculational (statistical) uncertainty (0.0006); and M is the margin of safety (0.02). Consequently, k-eff ≤ 0.96 are subcritical with a conservative 2% safety margin.
14 Weight factors are inversely proportional to the squares of the standard deviations. A COG model of the Am-Li neutron source (S/N 401009) has also been developed as shown in Table 6 -2 and the dimensioned sketch above this table.
DISCUSSION OF CONTINGENCIES
The total mass of this source is modeled as 54.5 grams.
NORMAL CONDITIONS
The highest authorized reactivity TACS configuration corresponds to the TACS with 694. will reduce k-eff. Therefore, any configuration using any combination of these parts is acceptable for use in the TACS.
Effect of the diaphragm
The COG calculated k-eff corresponding to the measured configuration by Barnett (with maximum authorized Lucite moderator, maximum fissile mass and 10 cm Lucite reflection) with a 0.059-inch SST diaphragm separating the two halves is k-eff = 0.9125 ± 0.0005 (file: tacs5 (in Table 6 -3)). This result is in good agreement with the measured multiplication value of about ten.
Other results presented in Table 6 -3, show that replacing this steel diaphragm with an Al-6061 diaphragm increases reactivity even if the diaphragm is significantly thicker. The highest (bounding) reactivity corresponds to a case with no diaphragm present in which the two halves of the TACS assembly in contact, where k-eff = 0.9293 ± 0.0005 (file: tacs1).
Effect of the Am-Li neutron source and Al-6061 parts
The COG calculational results given in Table 6 -3 demonstrate that the presence of the Am-Li neutron source (S/N 401009) or unlimited Al-6061 in the cavity results no significant increase in k-eff. Consequently, this source is acceptable for use with or without an Al-6061 source holder. Aluminum spacers are also acceptable for use in separating the two halves of the TACS and clearly there is no safety significance if these or other small aluminum parts were to fall into the TACS central cavity (an anticipated event). 
Effect of authorized reflector materials in close proximity to TACS
Several COG calculations were performed to assess the effects of people (H 2 O) or neutron detectors (polyethylene or Lucite) in close proximity to the TACS. COG calculations were also performed to assess the effects of using the (available) Tech-1D assembly mock high explosives (RM-05-20H) shells in place of the Lucite. These results given in Table 6 -4 confirm that Lucite is a superior reflector in comparison to polyethylene (LDPE or HDPE), RM-05-20H and water. The authorized Lucite reflector parts R2A/B and R3A/B provide 4 inches (10 cm) of Lucite reflection, which is demonstrated to be nearly effectively infinite since unlimited additional Lucite increases the reactivity only by ∆k-eff ≤ 1%.
The COG calculational results in 0.9372(6) 37.4 keV tacs22 10 cm Lucite + infinite HPDE (detectors) 10 0.9384(6) 38.1 keV tacs23 10 cm Lucite + infinite Lucite (detectors) 11 0.9400(6) 37.2 keV tacs28 10 cm Lucite + infinite concrete (walls) Effect of other reflector materials (instead of 10 cm Lucite) 12 0.9033(5) 124.9 keV tacs25a Infinite mock HE (RM-05-20H) 13 0.9047(6) 43.2 keV tacs24 Infinite water (people) 14 0.9291(6) 26.0 keV tacs25 Infinite HDPE (detectors) 15 0.9378(6) 170.7 keV tacs29 Infinite concrete (reference) 16 0.9417(6) 38.0 keV tacs26 Infinite Lucite (detectors)
Effect of neutron poisons
Substituting borated or lithium-doped polyethylene (or Lucite) in place of the pure Lucite reflector parts will decrease k-eff significantly and consequently such reflector parts (when available) are acceptable for use with the TACS.
Placement of thin Cadmium metal shells (see Table 3 -4) in the gap formed by the outermost HEU and innermost Lucite reflector surfaces will reduce k-eff significantly (due to neutron poisoning of the thermal neutron return) and consequently these parts are acceptable for use with the TACS.
Placement of a Cadmium sheet on top of the diaphragm separating the two halves of the TACS assembly also reduces k-eff and is therefore acceptable for use with the TACS. This effect has been observed experimentally to be small which indicates little poisoning but some reduction in interaction due to increased separation.
Effect of interaction with other fissionable materials
The TACS assembly machine provides 18-inches of spacing (center-to-edge) and the assembly machine will be located within a workstation (a defined area on the floor). The minimum separation between workstations is 12-inches per ES&H Manual, Document 20.6, Criticality Safety, Section 3.6, "Criticality Safety Mass Limit Guidelines for Workstations". Consequently, a hypothetical planar array of TACS assemblies located on a square 30-inch pitch were studied to simulate the effects of interaction with other fissionable materials. These cases also included effectively infinite concrete (axial) reflection to simulate the TACS located at 36-inches above the floor within a room with an 8-foot ceiling.
The COG results are provided in Table 6 -5 which indicate a reactivity increase of only ∆k-eff = 0.2% above that of a single TACS assembly with full Lucite reflection (see Section 6.1.3). 
Anticipated human errors during hand-stacking operations
A few COG calculations were performed to calculate the reactivity of those configurations shown above Table 6 -6 to convince the peer reviewer that these configurations are in fact much lower in reactivity than the (bounding) authorized configuration shown above Table 6 -1.
Consequently, there is no need for strict criticality controls on the step-by-step assembly sequence since a stacking error only results in a less reactive assembly that increases the margin of safety.
Good Practice: A storage cabinet should be used for the storage of Lucite and D-38 shells when not in use. Only two Lucite moderator parts should be in use at any time. 
Configuration 1 Configuration 2

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS
Abnormal conditions include unauthorized assembly configurations involving available (approved) parts, unauthorized configurations involving hypothetical (unapproved) parts, flooding, crushing and fire.
Immersion in water
Several COG calculations were performed to assess the TACS assembly under conditions of full immersion in water. The results provided in Table 6 -7 demonstrate that Lucite is a superior reflector but inferior moderator in comparison to water.
Consequently, the most reactive (bounding) configuration is one with no Lucite moderator parts and the maximum Lucite reflector parts (R2A/B and R3A/B) with all eight HEU shells and the inner cavity and all void spaces (between shells and beyond the 4 inch (10 cm) Lucite reflector) filled with water. The k-eff corresponding to this configuration (with no diaphragm and no source holder) is greater than 0.96, which is unacceptable.
However, the results in Table 6 -7 demonstrate that use of engineering design features (either a 0.059-inch SST diaphragm or 0.030-inch Al-6061 diaphragm with 1.5-inch-radius Al-6061 source holder) is sufficient to reduce the k-eff < 0.96, which is subcritical (safe) under full water immersion. 26 0.9362(6) 8.4 keV tacs9 Oy immersed in water (no Lucite) 27 0.9414(6) 14.9 keV tacs14 tacs8 w/0.059-in. SST diaphragm 28 0.9583(6) 16.8 keV tacs11 tacs8 w/1.5"-OR Al-6061 at center 29 0.9593(6) 17.4 keV tacs12 tacs8 w/1.5"-OR void at center 30 0.9571(6) 16.5 keV tacs16 tacs8 w/1.5"-OR-void+0.030"-Al6061-dia 31 0.9573(6) 16.1 keV tacs17 tacs8 w/1.5"-OR-Al6061+0.030"-Al6061-dia Full immersion without required engineering design features (incredible). 32 0.9633(6) 11.6 keV tacs7 tacs1 immersed in water 33 0.9660(6) 7.9 keV tacs15 tacs8 w/0.030-in. Al-6061 diaphragm 34 0.9675 (6) 8.3 keV tacs10 tacs8 w/0.010-in. Al-6061 diaphragm 35 0.9676 (6) 8.4 keV tacs8 tacs1 (w/o M3A+B) immersed in water
Design Feature: A source holder at least 3-inches in diameter shall be fixed to the 0.030-inch Al-6061 diaphragm prior to use with fissile materials.
Unauthorized additions of fissionable material (over-mass)
Addition of sufficient mass of other fissionable materials will achieve criticality in any system. The results in Table 6 -8 show that addition of about 1.0 kg Pu-239, 1.5 kg Pu-238, or 3.5 kg HEU to the TACS central cavity is necessary to achieve criticality. This administrative control will be implemented in an approved Operational Safety Plan (OSP) that assigns a Standardized Criticality Control Condition (SCCC) to a defined workstation for use by COMATS to ensure accountancy to the gram.
For a criticality accident to occur due to overmass, the following chain of events would have to occur:
(1) A significant quantity of SNM is transferred into the for use in another workstation; (2) The fissile material handler approaches the TACS workstation with this (unauthorized) material by mistake; and, (3) Two instructors allow placement of the unapproved item within (or near) the TACS (BEU) in a configuration not approved in the appendices to the OSP.
Consequently, this scenario is considered incredible (BEU). Note that the only other fissionable materials authorized are the negligible (non-accountable) quantity of 241
Am present in the sealed neutron source (S/N 401009) and the less than 50 grams of 235 U present in D-38 (which is addressed in the Section 6.2.4 as a reflector material).
It is acceptable to either establish a fissionable mass limit to accommodate the presence of the 3 mg of 241 Am present in S/N 401009 or consider this source as exempt from criticality control. The approach should be consistent with the practice of the facility.
Unauthorized moderators
Several COG calculations were performed where the limited (641 cm 3 ) volume cavity (between the 1.5-inch-radius Al-6061 source holder and inner-most HEU shell contour on both sides of the 0.030-inch-thick Al-6061 diaphragm) was completely filled with other moderator materials; namely, HDPE, ZrH 2 , Lucite, UH 3 , or Be fill the cavity in place of the M3A/B parts. As expected, the reactivity is greatest for HDPE, but in all cases k-eff < 0.96, which is safe (subcritical). Consequently, this TACS configuration is considered geometry-favorable since there is no criticality accident risk due to placement of any moderator within the available volume of the cavity.
Unauthorized reflectors
The results provided in Table 6 -10 indicate that the TACS can be made critical by the addition of a sufficient quantity of special reflector materials in place of the authorized Lucite reflector shells. 
Special concern reflectors (D, Be, C and their compounds)
The ES&H Manual, Document 20.6, Criticality, Section 3.4, "Special Concerns", identifies beryllium, graphite, deuterium or their compounds as materials with the potential for achieving a significantly reduced minimum critical mass. Consequently, in accordance with LLNL policy, operations with these materials in close proximity to fissionable materials require criticality safety review on a caseby-case basis.
This CSE has performed this review and these materials are deemed to constitute an unnecessary hazard and are therefore prohibited. These special concern materials are strictly controlled in accordance with laboratory policy and TACS activities are performed under the supervision of the Responsible Individual (RI) and qualified instructor familiar with this CSE and this potential hazard. Consequently, a criticality accident with these materials would require a scenario similar to that identified in Section 6.2.2, which has been determined to be incredible (BEU).
Heavy metal and other reflectors (U, Cu, ZrH 2 )
COG calculations indicate that TACS can also be driven critical with approximately 5.9-inches of natural uranium (or D-38). However, this thickness corresponds to a mass in excess of 900 kilograms, which is not credible since less than 23 kg of D-38 is available (see Table 3 -2). Therefore, an additional COG calculation has been performed to consider the effect of close-fitting reflection by 23 kg of natural uranium (or depleted uranium) in infinite Lucite in order to demonstrate that this configuration is subcritical (safe) with k-eff < 0.96.
The COG calculations with copper and ZrH 2 show that other heavy metals (or their compounds) may be a criticality hazard if present in huge quantities in close proximity to the TACS. However, this is not considered a credible hazard since no such parts are available. Nonetheless, these materials are prohibited as a good practice to ensure safety over the long run.
CONTROL: Depleted uranium mass is limited to 23.0 kg D-38.
The D-38 shells listed in Table 3 -2 are acceptable for use with the TACS as reflectors since their total mass is less than 23.0 kg D-38. Reflectors of naturaluranium, copper or other heavy metal (or their compounds) are not authorized.
Note that D-38 and or Nat-U are special nuclear materials that are controlled similar to fissile materials including a COMATS check. Consequently, the risk of a significant over-mass involving these materials is considered incredible.
Fire
The TACS itself (Al-6061, Lucite, D-38, HEU, Am-Li source) is not a credible fire risk. However, the neutron detectors and counting equipment are electrical equipment that could catch fire if sufficiently poorly maintained or abused.
This equipment is professionally maintained and checked out for proper performance prior to use with fissile materials. The combustible materials present in this equipment and the TACS itself correspond to an acceptable fire loading in order to ensure that a moderate or large fire is not credible.
The worst credible scenario is for the electrical equipment to overheat and possibly deform (or melt) some electrical or plastic components resulting in a smoke and stink event that would be immediately terminated by automatic activation of the sprinklers. Hand-held fire extinguishers are available in LLNL facilities for use by the RI, instructors, or other qualified personnel for putting out these types of fires.
Good practice: Instructors and responsible individuals should be trained in the use of fire extinguishers by completing PU-3007, Fire Extinguishers, or HS1670-W, Qualification for Fire Extinguishers Users -Web.
BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENTS
Beyond design basis events considered in this evaluation include catastrophic fire, crushing and latticing.
Catastrophic fire involving fissile materials
The fire loading in all fissile material workstations, rooms, and buildings, is strictly controlled to preclude this type of event. Automatic fire (sprinkler) suppression systems with smoke or particulate detectors and hand extinguishers are provided to immediately put out any fire before it could propagate and involve fissile materials.
Nonetheless, were such a (BEU) catastrophic fire to occur, a criticality accident would only be possible in the following scenario:
(1) A large fire occurs in close proximity to the TACS; (2) Fire melts nickel plating and HEU or exposes HEU to decomposition gases (hydrogen and oxygen) from Lucite or other plastics; (3) Hydrogen or oxygen converts a large quantity of HEU into dispersible (including pyrophoric) forms (oxides, hydrides, hydroxides, etc.); (4) Water (or Lucite) mixes with HEU in a slurry; and, (5) A critical system is achieved in an unsafe shape and volume.
This scenario is considered incredible. The largest Lucite shell is at least 10-inches from the edge of the assembly table. Consequently, it is unlikely to be directly exposed to flame. However, the minimum auto-ignition temperature of Lucite is only 304 degrees Celsius (or 580 °F), whereas the melting point of nickel and uranium is 1455 and 1132 degrees Celsius. Therefore, the Lucite is expected to (completely) decompose into gaseous reaction products liberating hydrogen and oxygen leaving a carbonaceous char before the (insulated) uranium could begin to melt. D-38 exposed to these gases could be converted to a pyrophoric powder. Granger 15 has reported a reaction rate of 100 grams per 30 minutes. Consequently, prompt activation of the fire suppression system or intervention by the instructors using hand extinguishers is sufficient to ensure safety (subcriticality).
Furthermore, the nickel-clad HEU parts are expected to resist attack from these gases and remain intact due to the non-reactive protective nickel coating. Minor hydriding could occur at the pole holes, but since this area is small and exposed to the air, a protective layer of oxide is likely to form over the small surface of the pole holes. In this likely event, there would also be no criticality accident risk.
An important design feature of the TACS assembly machine is that it contains no cavities that can accumulate (dispersible) fissile and moderator materials into an unsafe geometry.
Consequently, the only potential critical geometry would be one involving a somewhat intact lower assembly that could contain a large quantity of dispersible HEU mixed in water or Lucite from a decomposed or melted upper assembly. This is considered incredible. Nonetheless, the following controls are considered good practice.
CONTROL: TACS is a Criticality Hazard Type 2
.
Crushing
The TACS could only be crushed due to collapse of the facility due to a beyond design basis earthquake (BDBE). A simple model of the crushed TACS has been developed as described in Table 6 -12.
This model collapses the source holder such that its radius at the waist equals the inner-most radius of the smallest Oy shell and the height is calculated as an ellipsoid that preserves the (assumed 200 cc) volume. The Oy shells are modeled in contact and the minimum thickness (as shown in the Figure above Table 6 -12) preserved at the waist. The height of the ellipsoidal shape is calculated to preserve the actual Oy mass. The Lucite is modeled similarly based on parts R2A/B and R3A/B. The entire assembly is then immersed in infinite concrete. COG calculates k-eff < 0.96 for this hypothetical (bounding) configuration, which indicates that any degree of crushing will not result in a criticality accident. 52 0.9448(6) 550.0 keV bdbec As above but concrete replaces Lucite. 53 0.9510(6) 395.3 keV bdbe As shown in Table 6 -3. 
Latticing
The minimum thickness of a TACS HEU hemi-shell is 0.146-inch (or 0.37 cm). A few COG calculations were performed to study the effect of interstitial moderation by immersing the TACS in water and increasing the distance between each fissile shell as shown in the figure below. The results of these calculations demonstrate a significant increase in k-eff > 0.96 indicating a potential criticality hazard. However, the controls listed below are judged sufficient to preclude any credible hazard. These controls are supplemented by the good practices listed in Section 7. (6) 16.1 eV tacs17 Immersed with 0.0-inch gaps 55 0.9747 (6) 20.0 eV tacs63 Immersed with 0.5-inch gaps 56 0.9868 (6) 22.1 eV tacs61 Immersed with 1.0-inch gaps 57 0.9813 (6) 21.5 eV tacs62 Immersed with 1.5-inch gaps CONTROL: Spacers, shims, or plastics shall not be used to offset individual shells from one another.
DESIGN FEATURES AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
Design features of the TACS that enhance criticality safety include:
(1) A neutron source holder that minimizes the cavity volume and enhances safety under flooding (see §6.2.1) and crushing (see Section 6.3.1) scenarios.
(2) An assembly machine (tabletop) that ensures that the neutron source holder is always present by fixing it to the diaphragm.
Administrative controls to ensure subcriticality (safety) are provided as Standard Criticality Control Condition I for implementation in the OSP as shown below. The OSP shall also identify that the TACS is a Criticality Hazard Type 2.
Condition I Material and Form
A. Enriched uranium is limited to 20.9 kg 235 U. B. Authorized enriched uranium parts are 18325, 18326, 500154, 500155, 500156, 500157, 23181, and 23184 . 
Shape
A. Spacers, shims, or plastics shall not be used to offset individual shells from one another. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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Appendix A Sample COG Input Listing
-------------------------------------------- mat=11 a-surfaces $ Dimensions in INCHES $ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- $ Lower assembly (moveable half) -heavy $ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1/cc) $ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ $ Assembly midplane (no diaphragm) $ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 15 plane z 0.0 $ Midplane $ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ $ Upper assembly (fixed half) -light $ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 21
